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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
)

ACCULOG, INC., a State of
)
Colorado corporation, ROBERT
PFISTER and KENTON SHAW,
)
co-partners doing business
under the firm name and style )
of ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 18133

)
)

vs.

)

KEITH PETERSON, dba,
PETERSON FORD,

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages resulting from a
fire to the Plaintiffs' geophysical logging unit, the fire having
occurred following repairs performed by the Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury with the Honorable George
E. Ballif presiding.

The court directed a verdict against the

Plaintiffs on the issue of loss of profits.

The jury apportioned

negligence 86% to the Plaintiffs and 14% to the Defendant causing
the Plaintiffs to be nonsui ted on their claim for damages for the
total loss of their geophysical logging unit.
rendered on September 23, 1981.

The verdict was

Judgment in the case was entered
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on October 28, 1981, following the Court's denial of the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial which was filed on September 30, 1981
The Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was filed on November 16, 1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants

request that

the judgment be reversed and

that the case be remanded with orders:
(1)

That the District Court direct a verdict in favor of
the Appellants on the issue of comparative negligence
and enter a judgment for the stipulated amount of dam-

ages to the Plaintiffs' logging unit, and
(2)

That the Plaintiffs' be granted a new trial on the
issues of loss of profits and non-stipulated damages
attributable to the loss of the Plaintiff's van and
logging unit.

In the alternative, the Appellants request that the judgment be reversed and that the case be remanded for a new trial on all issues
not

stipulat~d

to previously by the parties.
FACTS

The Plaintiffs, at all times relevant, were in the business
of logging the presence of uranium ore and other minerals.

Their

business involved the use of several borehole logging units which
consisted of vans equipped with complex electronic and mechanical
equipment.
Probing and logging for uranium is accomplished by lowering a probe down a hole previously drilled by a drilling company.
The hole typically is about six inches wide and several hundred
feet deep.

The probe, as it is lowered, senses the geophysical

properties of the hole at the different levels.

A drift survey

of the hole is also taken to show how much the hole deviates from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

being perfectly vertical (Pretrial Order, T. 26-27).
VAN LEASED AND LOGGING UNIT PURCHASED
On or about March 18, 1979, the Plaintiffs leased a 1977
four wheel drive Ford E250 quadravan for the purpose of installing
a bore-hole logging unit.

A Mount Sopris logging unit was pur-

chased and installed in the van on or about May 20, 1979.

Be-

tween the date of acquisition and the date the logging unit was
installed in the van, the van was driven about 200 miles by the
Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs encountered no problems relating
to the operation of the van (T. 196-197).
The van and logging unit were put to work during the first
week in June, 1979, on a logging job for URADCO near LaSal Junction in San Juan County, Utah (T. 26).

Use of the van and logging

unit on the URADCO job consisted of driving the van from Moab to
LaSal Junction for about 20 miles on a paved highway, then driving
about five miles on dirt or gravel roads.

The van would then

travel from drill hole to drill hole where the Plaintiff would log
for the presence of uranium (T. 27).

The terrain on the URADCO

job required use of four wheel drive on rare occasions (Tr. 28).
VAN OVERHEATS AND "CUTS OUT"
No servicing of the van occurred following the purchase of
the van until June 28, 1979.

On that date the van was taken to

the Defendant's garage in Moab, Utah because it had been intermittently "cutting out" and overheating (T. 28).

Mr. Jim Gates,

one of the Plaintiffs' employees who operated the van and logging
unit on the URADCO job during the month of June, testified that
the van had experienced the overheating and "cutting out" about
four times prior to the date that the van was delivered to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant, and that the symptoms occurred intermittently about
once every three or four days over a two week period.

Gates tes-

tified that by "cutting out" he meant that the engine would stop
for about "a half second" and then resume operation while the van
was in motion.

Gates testified that he had never smelled gasoline

or heard the engine backfire prior to the date on which it was
delivered to the Defendant (Tr. 28-30).
Mr. Kenton Shaw, who also operated the van on the URADCO
job with Mr. Gates, testified that the over-heating and ''cutting
out" would happen when the van was traveling uphill whether on the
highway or on a back road going up a steep incline (T. 72).
VAN DELIVERED TO DEFENDANT FOR REPAIRS
When the van was delivered to the Defendant's garage at
about 9:30 a.m. on June 28, 1979, the Defendant's employees
promptly diagnosed the "cutting out" to be caused by a clogged
fuel filter (T. 74; Ex. 1).

Mr. Allen Simon, the Defendant's em-

ployee, removed the fuel filter from the carburator and installed
a new fuel filter when he found flakes of foreign matter in the
old fuel filter (T. 240-241, 265-266).

Simon testified that the

flexible fuel line which connected the melted fuel line to the
fuel filter had leaked gasoline when he started the engine after
replacing the fuel filter and that he had then replaced the old
flexible fuel line with a new fuel line.

He could not recall,

however, whether he had installed new clamps on the flexible fuel
line

(T.

240-241, 252).

the fuel filter (T. 238).

He testified that he put a gasket on
Simon further testified that he con-

sidered the foreign matter in the fuel filter to be the primary
cause of the van's problems (T. 265-266).
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VAN AND LOGGING UNIT DESTROYED BY FIRE
Gates and Shaw returned to the Defendant's premises at
about noon, paid for the work performed by the Defendant's employees, and drove the van to the URADCO job site (T. 32, 36, 75).
No problems with the van were encountered on the approximately
25 mile trip to the job site.

Once at the site the Plaintiffs'

van was only driven "a few hundred yards" between holes during
the day and no problems were encountered (T. 38, 81).
Gates and Shaw finished logging holes at about 8:45 p.m.
and started back to Moab.

After traveling less than two miles

on a down hill grade at a slow rate of speed, Gates and Shaw
smelled gasoline coming from the direction of the engine compartment.

Within approximately one minute they heard a "pop" or a

"kawoosh" sound.

Shaw, who was driving, observed flames coming

from under the front left wheel well and stopped the van.

Shaw

and Gates attempted to throw dirt on the flames underneath the
engine and lifted the engine hood and attempted to extinguish
the fire, which had covered most of the engine, by throwing dirt
on the flames (T. 39-43).

They were able to slow the fire but

not to fully contain it and the flames spread into the cab of the
van (T. 43-44).

The van's engine was situated in a "really diff-

icult position" back under the hood and its inaccessability obstructed efforts to extinguish the fire (T. 42-43; Ex. 5).
Despite fearing that the, van might blow up (T. 92), Shaw
and Gates entered the van and salvaged as much loose equipment
and property as they could.

Several expensive pieces of probing

equipment were saved, however, most of the equipment was bolted
into the van and could not be saved (T. 43-44).

The fire resulted
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in the Plaintiffs' loss of the van valued at $7,290.00 under the
lease, and Mount Sopris equipment with a stipulated value of at
least $41,687.95 (Pretrial Order, pages 2-4).

After the fire,

the Plaintiffs were unable to perform two logging contracts with
Amoco Minerals because of the loss of their unit and the Plaintiffs claimed damages at trial for a loss of profits of over
$33,000.00 (T. 175-182, 209-214).
Shaw testified that neither he nor Gates nor anyone else
had so much as lifted the hood of the van after it was delivered
to them by the Defendant's employees until the hood was lifted to
extinguish the fire (T. 75-76).

Both Gates and Shaw testified

on cross examination, despite the Plaintiffs' relevancy objection,
that the van did not have a fire extinguisher in it (T. 53, 89).
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The Plaintiffs called Mr. Robert J. Caldwell as an expert
witness.

Mr. Caldwell testified that he had examined the van

after the fire and that he had also examined the fuel filter
which had been salvaged from the van prior to his inspection of
the van by Dr. Rudolph

Limpert, the Defendant's expert.

Caldwell

testified that based upon his examination of the van and fuel
filter, the testimony given, and Dr .. Limpert's failure to find a
gasket with the fuel filter when he examined the engine,

it was

his opinion that the most probable cause of the fire was the
negligent failure of the Defendant's employees to install a gasket on the filter when it was screwed into the carburator.

He

testified that gasoline pumped by the fuel pump probably squirted
out of the fuel filter threads onto the intake manifold where
ignition occurred.

He testified that the salvaged fuel filter
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had what had been molten carburator aluminum

d(~posiLs

on

i L~;

threads and that since he could not get a new gasket to fiL over
the aluminum deposits on the threads it was extremely unlikely
that a gasket had ever been installed on the fuel filter as required.

He testified that the fire was "definately a fuel system-

caused and fed fire'' and that the gasket was made of a ferrous
material and could not have been destroyed or melted in the fire
(T. 114-119).

Dr. Limpert testified that, in his opinion, the fire had
probably been caused by excessive fuel in the carburator system
being ignited either by a backfire or by coming in contact with
hot exhaust components (T. 299).

He testified that the missing

gasket could have "stuck" to the molten carburator when the filter
fell out of the burning carburator and that molten aluminum could
have then dripped onto the threads.

He also testified that the

gasket may have been pushed off of the engine prior to the time
that he made his inspection and found the burnt filter (T. 311-312).
He acknowledged on cross examination that another reason for his
failure to find a gasket could be that a gasket was never installed
in the first place (T. 330-331).

Caldwell testified that it was

unlikely that a gasket would have "stuck" to the carburator because
it would have fit tightly on the threads of the fuel filter when
installed (T. 119).
DISPOSITION
At the close of the Plaintiffs' case the court granted the
Defendant's motion for a partial directed verdict that the Plaintiff had failed to prove a loss of profits (T. 233-235).

The

Plaintiffs' evidence regarding loss of profits is fully discussed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

in Point III and the facts relating to loss of profits will therefore not be set forth here.
At the close of the Defendant's case the Plaintiff moved the
court for a directed verdict that the Defendant had failed to prove
that the Plaintiffs were negligent or that they had contributed to
the cause of the fire.

The court denied the Defendant's motion on

the belief that the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher,
which could have been used to extinguish the fire, was a contributing cause of the fire.

The court also denied a motion by the Plain-

tiffs to bar defense counsel from arguing that the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher constituted contributory negligence
(T. 340-342).

The Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher

was then argued to the jury by the Defendants (T. 394-396).

The

jury returned a special verdict finding that the Defendant had been
negligent in servicing the Plaintiffs' van and that said negligence
wasaproximate cause of the fire.

The jury also found that the

Plaintiffs' were negligent and that said negligence was a proximate
cause of the fire.

The jury apportioned negligence 86% to the

Plaintiffs and 14% to the Defendant causing the Plaintiff to be
nonsuited (T. 403).

The court, thereafter, denied the Plaintiffs'

motion for a new trial.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFFS ON THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFFS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND IN NOT BARRING DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM ARGUING TO THE JURY
THAT FAILURE TO HAVE A FIRE EXTINGUISHER CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFFS
During cross examination of the Plaintiffs the Defendant

elicited testimony over the Plaintiffs' objection

to

show that the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the van constituted negligence on the part of the PldinLifl.

Dur-

ing the cross examination of Jim Gates Lhe foll.owinq occurred:
Q.

Now, you testified there was some of what you
used the words "sophisticated and expensive"
equipment

that was on the van,

is that corr,ect?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you're certain there wasn't a fire extinguisher in the van?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did that concern you at any time while you were
operating that van?
MR. MORTENSEN:

Objection, your Honor.

I

don't mind him answering the question, but I'm
not sure of the relevancy of it.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

MR. GATES:

I don't believe I

of one.
Q.

He may answer.
was ever aware

It may have just skipped my mind.

(By Mr. Hayes)

If that equipment had belonged to

you--now, you were just an employee, is that
correct?
A.

I had ten percent of two trucks.

Q.

Ownership?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You had a stake in this Acculog Field Service, is

It was more or less an ownership.

that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were an owner, basically, of the operation,
to some extent?

A.

Well, a very small part of it, yes.

Q.

And being an owner and realizing that there was
some very sophisticated and expensive equipment on
the van, can you tell me why a fire extinguisher
was not kept on the van?

A.

No.

(T. 53-54)

During the Defendant's cross-examination of Kenton Shaw the
following exchange occurred:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

You were a part owner in this business, weren't
you?

A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

You had an interest in that van, and the contents
of that van, isn't that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And there was expensive equipment in the van?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And

I

think "sophisticated" is the word that has

been used, but.it was expensive equipment in the
van, is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Had you ever made any attempts to get a fire
extinguisher for that van?

A.

Well, it was standard practice to have one in
our vans.

But it was a new van.

We just hadn't

gotten around to putting one in it yet.
Q.

You hadn't put a fire extinguisher in it yet?

A.

No.

Q.

Are you familiar with the regulations of MSHA?

A.

No, I'm not.

Q.

You have never heard of that particular term?

A.

No.

Q.

You weren't familiar with the fact, then, that
fire extinguishers are required on that type of
equipment?
MR. MORTENSEN:
THE COURT:

Objection, your honor.

Just a minute.

MR. MORTENSEN:

For what purpose?

Your Honor, I believe that

an advocate for the other side is testifying now,
and I object to the question.
THE COURT:
Q.

(By Mr. Hqyes)

I'll sustain the objection.
Are you aware of any regulations,

either federal or state, that require fire extinguishers on vehicles used in mineral exploraA.

tion or logging, such as you were doing?
No, I'm not.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

Okay.

But it's your testimony at this time,

that it's standard procedure to have fire ext.inguishers on this type of vehicle?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what would be the purpose for having a fire
extinguisher on a van like this?

A.

Just safety reasons.

Q.

You heard Mr. Gates testify that he felt like
at one time you might have contained the fire,
is that correct?

You heard him testify as to

that?
A.

Yes, I heard him.

Q.

Did you have the same thoughts at any time?

A.

Well, when I first saw it, I thought we could put
it out.

Q.

Have you ever used a fire extinguisher before?

A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

Have you ever seen one used?

A.

I'm not sure if I have or not.

Q.

Is it your opinion that if you would have had a
fire extinguisher, you would have been able to
put that fire out, initially?

A.

It's hard to say.

Q.

But there's a pretty good chance that you could
have, though?

A.

Yes, I think we had a chance.

Q.

And if you would have put it out at that point,
the point that we are talking about, you would
have just had an engine fire,

is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How long did the throwing of dirt on the engine
activity go on?

How long did you throw dirt on

the engine?
A.

Approximately five to ten minutes.

Q.

And what did you do after that time?

A.

Well, the fire started to spreading towards the
back of the van, and so we started removing items
out
of
van.
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Q.

Was there any time in between that, that you
were just observing the fire?

A.

I think we stood back a couple of times and
tried to decide whether or not it was going to
blow up.

(T.

89-92)

At the close of the Defendant's case, the Plaintiffs moved
the court for a directed verdict that the Defendant had failed
to prove any contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs
and also moved the court to bar defense counsel from arguing
that the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher constituted negligence and a cause of the fire:
MR. MORTENSEN:

For the Plaintiffs, I

would note an exception to the Special Verdict
form,

itself.

The Plaintiff will contend that

there was no evidence to support submitting the
qu~stion

of comparative or contributory negli-

gence to the jury, and, therefore, the issue
should not be placed before the jury.
In conjunction with the Special Verdict,
two Instructions come into effect, and that
would be Instruction No. 9, being a proximate
cause instruction, and insofar as it makes reference to more than one cause being possible, and
in the second paragraph that should not be applicable to this matter.
Similarly, Instruction No. 10--well, I'll
not except to No. 10, because I

don't believe

it's really effective unless No. 9 is applied
with it.
As a further statement in support of my
position with regard tot he Special Verdict, it
would appear that the only evidence that could
possibly be argued in the case regarding any contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff would be regarding the issue raised in the
trial by defense counse,
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have a fire extinguisher on
time.

tht~

v<)hicl1' dt-

Lh(~

And the Plaintiffs would submit that such

a matter does not go to contributory or compard-tive negligence, and it does not go to causation
and, therefore, should not be submitted to the
jury.

Thqt's all.
Your Honor, I stated for the record, first

of all, that I don't think the issue of contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury.
THE COURT:

You don't think there is an

issue of any negligence on the part of your people?
MR. MORTENSEN:

Right.

Along with that, I

would move the court to instruct the defense
counsel that he should not argue the issue of
the lack of a fire extinguisher on the truck as
relating to the fire, because there is no cause.
THE COURT:

We went over that off the re-

cord last night, I think, and I had some reservations about it.

I have some feelings that it

may be mitigation only.

But I think on the basis

of this kind of loss, which the total damages
certainly can be attributed to certain various
acts along the way before the total damage comes
about and, therefore, the fire extinguisher issue,
would be an issue that would be, to a degree, a
legitimate argument in negligence as to at what
point possible in the total course of the negligence causing the ultimate damage it could have
been administered, and a portion, or some portion of the total damage that resulted, could
have been eliminated.
I think maybe it's a close question, but I
think it's resolved rather than giving a mitigation instruction, there is no way we can give
a mitigation instruction since the damages have
been agreed to.
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But I think it is a legitimate matter and
can be handled by both of you in your arguments
in having it considered as one of the negligent
acts, if it is considered to be a negligent act
by the jury that affects some portion of the
damages, possibly.
So they will be looking at it from the
standpoint of it being maybe just another one of
the elements that ended up in causing the fire.
What I'm saying, I'm going to allow him to
argue it.

I think there are ways that you can

also counter it, aside from the basic question
as to whether it is lack of ordinary and prudent
care on the part of these people to be out doing
their work without one in the van.

That is a

very serious question that the jury may feel is
not negligence at all.
You certainly cannot allude to any statutory or governmental issues like that, Mr. Hayes.
MR. HAYES:

I understand.

(T. 340-342)

(Emphasis added.)
The only facts argued by defense counsel during closing
argument to prove that the Plaintiffs were comparatively negligent were facts relating to the Plaintiffs' failure to have a
fire extinguisher in the van and the Plaintiffs' company policy
that fire extinguishers should be placed in each van for safety
purposes.

He argued that a fire extinguisher would have limited

the fire to the vehicle's engine compartment (T. 394-395).
Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the Plaintiffs were being
extra prudent in having policy requiring that fire extinguishers
be placed in their vans and that under Instruction No. 6 the law
did not require the Plaintiffs to be extra prudent but only to
act with reasonable and ordinary prudence.

Plaintiffs' counsel

further argued that the failure to have a fire extinguisher to
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extinguish the fire could not be a cause of the fin' <lnd,

t her•,

fore, there was no proximate cause attributable to the Plaintiffs
(T. 397-399).

Nevertheless, the jury found the Plaintiffs to l1clve

been negligent, the Plaintiffs' negligence to have been a cause
of the fire and the jury apportioned negligence 86% to the Plaintiffs and 14% to the Defendants ( T. 403-404 ).
The evidence offered by the Defendant to prove the Plaintiffs guilty of comparative negligence was clearly insufficent to
allow reasonable minds to conclude that the Plaintiffs had been
negligent or had contributed to the cause of the fire and the
court, therefore, erred in submitting the case to the jury.
While counsel have been unable to find any case directly
on point, there is a large body of law regarding the legal effect
of the failure of a plaintiff to use a provided seat belt when
injured in an automobile accident.

The seat belt law is over-

whelmingly to the effect that a plaintiff's failure to use a
provided seat belt cannot be used to bar his recovery.
fense is not favored for several reasons.

The de-

First, the failure to

use a seat belt cannot be said to cause an auto accident.
v. Henninger,

Gibson

(Ind. App.) 350 NE2d 631, 92 ALR 3rd 1 (1976).

Second, the defense invites the jury to speculate as to what injuries would have been prevented if the seat belt would have been
used.

Gibson, supra.

458 (1973).

Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P2d

Third, the defense would require one who is lawfully

using the highway to anticipate that another driver may be negligent where, on the contrary, he is entitled to assume that others
will use due care for his safety.

Hampton v. State Highway Comm.,

209 Kan. 565, 498 P2d 236 (1972);

Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich.
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App. 119, 167 NW2d 606 (1969).

Fourth, the defense would do

violence to the standard of care exercised by a reasonably prudent
man, since at least 75 percent of motorists don't use seat belts.
McCord v. Green, Dist. Colo. App., 362 A2d 720 (1976).

The de-

fense has been rejected by comparative negligence .states as well
as contributory negligence states.

Amend v. Bell, Wash., 570 P2d

138, 95 ALR 3rd 225 (1977).
The policy behind the seat belt cases must apply to the
Plaintiffs' case.

First, the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire

extinguisher in the van cannot, by any sense of the imagination,
have been the cause of the fire.

Both experts who testified agreed

that the fire started on top of the engine next to the carburator
and was of gasoline origin.

No one during the trial even hinted

that the absence of an extinguisher caused the fire.
Second, the jury in the Plaintiffs' case was invited to
speculate as to what might have happened had the Plaintiffs had
a fire extinguisher, had the fire extinguisher worked properly
and had the fire not have expanded into the interior of the van.
No expert testimony was offered by the Defendant to show that a
fire extinguisher would have stopped the fire.

The only testimony

available to the Defendant was the testimony of Mr. Shaw, who had
never seen a fire extinguisher used, that a fire extinguisher
might have provided the Plaintiffs a "chance" to stop the fire:
Q.

Did you have the same thoughts at any time?

A.

Well, when I first saw it,

I though we could put

it out.
Q.

Have you ever used a fire extinguisher before?

A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

Have you ever seen one used?
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A.

I'm not sure if I have or not.

Q.

Is it your opinion that if you would have had a
fire extinguisher, you would have been able to
put that fire out, initially?

A.

It's hard to say.

Q.

But there's a pretty good chance that you could
have, though?

A.

Yes, I think we had a chance.

(T. 91-92)

This testimony can only be characterised as speculative.

It was

used in the Defendant's argument to the jury over the Plaintiffs'
objection (T. 341, 394-395).

The jury obviously concluded that

an extinguisher would have stopped the fire in the engine compartment and found,

in effect, that 86% of the damage caused was

the Plaintiffs' fault for not being able to stop the fire.

This

is exactly the type of guess work that was condemned in Gibson and
Fischer, both supra.
Third, the defense of failure to have a fire extinguisher
requires the Plaintiffs to have anticipated that the Defendant
was going to be negligent and cause their van and equipment to
burn even

though

the Plaintiffs did nothing to cause the fire and

were entitled to assume that the Defendant had replaced the fuel
filter in a prudent manner.
Fourth, the defense of failure to have a fire extinguisher
does violence to the standard of care exercised by a reasonably
prudent man since there is no evidence that even a small fraction
of Americans see fit to put a fire extinguisher in every possession
of value that they own.

If this defense is allowed in this case,

the state of the law will hereafter be as follows:

Everyone will

be required to have a fire extinguisher in his home, his automobile, and everywhere else where he has a "significant" investment.
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If A negligently starts B's house on fire and B doesn't have a
fire extinguisher, then B has no cause of action against A if it
appears that B might have had a "chance" to stop the fire by using
a

fire extinguisher.

By the same token, everyone will also be

required to wear bullet-proof vests, to wear seatbelts, to wear
parachutes on airplanes, and to avoid driving compact cars which
could be smashed by a Mack truck.

Fischer v. Moore, supra at page

459.

Additionally, the law is clear that a company's safety
rule is not the standard by which its conduct is to be tested, but
rather the company's conduct is to be limited to the standard of
reasonable and ordinary care.

Waddell v. Crescent Motors, Inc.,

Ala., 69 So2d 414 (1953); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Clark,
Ala.,

34 So

148 Wis 54,

917 ( 1903).

In Otto v. Milwaukee Northern Ry Co.,

134 NW 157 (1912), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:

Complaint is made because the court
admitted in evidence a rule of the company
for the guidance of its servants, requiring
them to exercise the highest degree of care
in handling cars to avoid injuring themselves or others. Obviously, that had nothing to do with the case. The law, not any
rule of the company, was the test of defenddant' s duty. Moreover, no such duty as that
indicated by the rule is legally required as
regards a mere licensee. Why the trial court
permitted the introduction of a matter so
very foreign to the case, is not perceived.
Moreover, why the illegitimate cha1acter of
the evidence was intensified by the court,
upon objection being made, remarking:
"I
cannot see that that does anything more
than declare what the law would declare
' to
but I think I will overrule the objection
that." The jury may well have gotten
therefrom the idea that the law required the
high standard of care mentioned in the rule
as regards the personal safety of a mere licensee like respondent, which, of course, is
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not the fact.
The court evidently emerged
from the delusion in that regard before the
close of the trial since we find the jury wrre
very emphatically instructed that appellant
owed the respondent the duty only of exercising
ordinary care for her personal safety.
Whether
that wholly cured the error so as to render it
nonprejudicial is not free from difficulty.
The trial court's allowance of evidence regarding fire extinguishers and its refusal to limit the Defendant's closing arguement, clearly invited the jury to conclude that the Plaintiffs'
company policy was to be used as the standard to weigh the Plaintiffs' conduct.

The jury accepted the court's invitation and

found the Plaintiffs' 86% negligent even though the jury determined that the Defendant's negligent repair of the fuel line
caused the

fire~

In the seat belt cases, the courts have upheld the trial
court's exclusion of evidence relating to non-use of available
seat belts and have upheld the trial court's granting of djrected
verdicts for the Plaintiffs on the issue of contributory or comparative negligence.
tion,

Automobil~

(See cases cited supra and others in Annota-

Occupant's Failure to use Seat Belt as Contribu-

tory Negligence, 92 ALR 3rd

9~)

The trial court in the instant

case committed reversible error in not excluding evidence regarding the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher and in not
granting a directed verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs on the issue
of the Plaintiffs' comparative negligence.

Henderson v. Meyer,

Utah, 533 P2d 290 (1975).
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT
OF 86% OF THE NEGLIGENCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS
This point assumes, for sake of argument onlj, that somehow the jury could have found that the Plaintiffs' failure to have
I

a fire extinguisher constituted negligence on their part and that
somehow the jury could have rationally found that the Plaintiffs'
failure to have a fire extinguisher was a proximate cause of the
fire.
It is the Plaintiffs' position that even if the Plaintiffs'
conduct were somehow a contributing cause of the fire,

the Plain-

tiffs' conduct nevertheless played such an insignificant part
that the jury could not have reasonably concluded from the evidence before it that the Plaintiffs were more at fault than was
the Defendant.

It, therefore, is also the Plaintiffs' position

that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant
the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial under Rule 50(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in applicable part:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties for any of the
following causes ...
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
The evidence already discussed in Point I will not be recited again except to emphasize that the jury concluded that the
fire was caused by the Defendant's negligence in servicing the
fuel filter.

Any negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs had,
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of necessity, to do with their failure to prevent the firo from
spreading after its cause was first set in motion by the Def endant.

The trial court allowed the issue of the Plaintiffs' negli-

gence to be submitted to the jury only on the basis that their
failure to have a fire extinguisher might have constituted negligence (T. 341-342).

The only ground argued to the jury by the

defense counsel for imputing negligence to the Plaintiffs was
that the Plaintiffs had failed to have a fire extinguisher in
the van when it burned (T. 394-396).

There was absolutely no com-

petent evidence before the jury to show that a fire extinguisher
would, in fact, have prevented the fire from spreading even if the
Plaintiffs' had placed one in their logging unit.
The evidence was completely insufficient, therefore, to
support a finding that the Plaintiffs had been equally, or more,
negligent than had the Defendant, and the trial court abused its
discretion in not granting a new trial to the Plaintiffs.

Holmes

v. Nelson, 7 U2d 435, 326 P2d 722 (1958).
POINT III
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS' HAD FAILED TO PROVE A LOSS OF
PROFITS.

THE

At the close of the Plaintiffs' case the Defendant

~noved

for a directed verdict:
THE COURT:

The record will show the

jurors have retired from the Courtroom.

Mr.

Hayes, I believe you had a motion to make?
MR. HAYES:

Yes, your Honor.

Defendant

moves at this time, at the close of the plaintiffs' case, for a directed verdict based upon
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the fact that the plaintiffs have failed to
meet their burden of proof as to any negligence
on the part of the defendant.

That they have

failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence where men of reasonable minds differ,
that the defendant was in any way.negligent or
responsible for the losses that they are claiming.
With that, the defendant also moves for a
directed verdict aimed at the portion of the
claimed damages made by the plaintiff.for lost
profits or income based upon the facts that
they have failed to meet their burden of proof,
showing the formation of a contract that is
recognized as binding under the laws of the
State of Utah.
And we would ask for dismissal of the entire case, or in the alternative, partial dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for lost profits
from the damages they sustained.
THE COURT:
Mortensen?

Do you want to be heard, Mr.

Just the second question is all I'll

need to hear you on.
MR. MORTENSEN:

Your Honor,

I

believe we

have adequately met the burden regarding the lost
contract damages.

Mr. Lewis clearly stated on

the stand that the job would have been these peoples had they had the unit available.

And while

everybody admits that there was no formal documents drawn up,

I

don't believe the law requires

people to do useless things.

And

I

would just

submit it with that statement.
MR. HAYES:

May

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. HAYES:

To that representation, it's

I

just make one comment?

not our position that our motion is based upon
-22-
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the lack of formality.

We are basing our [11nL ion

on the lack of a person who was autho1,ized Lo contract.

We do not have someone that could cnntr<lcl

for Amoco who has testified that a contr<lct was
formed.

It just does not reach that at that point,

and with that we'll submit it.
THE COURT:

The Court will deny your motion

as to the first request, that is, a directed verdict on negligence.

The Court will deny that

motion, but will grant the second motion as to
the claim for lost profits on the contracts for
two reasons:

One, as you have stated, no con-

tracting authority having been a party to the
claimed contract.

And the other, I see no way

that the jury can conclude what the profit on the
job would have been.

So that will be the Ruling

of the Court (T. 233-235).
The lower court committed reversible error in granting a
partial directed verdict against the Plaintiffs since there was
sufficient evidence before the court that the jury could have reasonably determined that the Plaintiffs had lost profits due to
the destruction of their logging unit.
Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states
that a motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefore.

The specific ground stated by the Defendant

regarding the issue of loss of profits was that the Plaintiffs had
failed to prove their case because they had not produced

a~

Amoco

Minerals officer, who was authorized to sign written agreements, to
testify that a contract was formed between the parties.

The

court erroneously granted the Defendant's motion on the basis of
this specific ground.

The court, however, in violation of Rule

SO(a) also granted the motion on the nonstated ground that the
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court could "see no way that the jury can conclude what the profit
on the job would have been.''

This action was taken by the court

even though the Defendant had not by motion disputed that the
jury could have concluded from testimony given what the Plaintiffs'
profits would have been.

The court's action in granting the mo-

tion on an unstated ground was therefore improper and the unstated
ground should not be available to sustain the court's action on
appeal.

Mcintyre v. Ajax Mining Company, 20 U 323, 60 P 552 (1899);

Barlow v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 57 U 312, 194 P 665 (1920).
Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs will address both grounds herein since
both are without merit in any event.
In directing ·a verdict, the court must examine the evidence
in a light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is
intended and must determine every controverted fact in his favor.
Boskovich v. Utah Construction Company, 132 U 387, 259 P2d 885
(1953).

The facts taken most favorable to the Plaintiffs are as

follows:
Pursuant to a written invitation to bid sent by Stephen
Lewis, an Amoco Minerals geologist, the Plaintiffs had bid on a
logging job offered by Amoco Minerals by using their written
price list for the Plaintiffs' Mount Sopris logging unit (T. 165,
198; Ex. 12).

Shortly before the date that the van and Mount

Sopris equipment were destroyed by fire, Philip Canter, the Plaintiffs manager, was notified by Lewis that the Plaintiffs had been
awarded the job, which was to take place in Alzada, Montana (T. 166,
199-200).

The Plaintiffs' van and logging equipment were de-

stroyed several days prior to the performance date of the job and
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marily in the industry is done shortly befort' Lhe jot1 ht'qins.
Canter notified Lewis that the Plaintiffs would not be ilble to
perform the job because of the loss of the van and logging equipment and Lewis, thereupon, awarded the job to Century Geophysical,
a logging company which had submitted a bid higher than the Plaintiffs (T. 166-168, 200, 215; Ex. 13, 14, 15).

In a memorandum

dated July 2, 1979 to his superior, John B. Squyres, Lewis stated
that the Plaintiffs had submitted the low bid and had experienced
operators and reliable equipment (Mount Sopris), but that their
unit was damaged before project start-up, clearly indicating that
the job would have been the Plaintiffs but for the fire (Ex. 13).
Canter contacted Mount Sopris on the next working day
following the fire and ordered exact replacement of the destroyed
Mount Sopris equipment lT. 201-202);

Although the van was replaced

within two to three weeks form the date of the fire, Mount Sopris
was unable to make replacement of the equipment until November 6,
1979 despite Canter's request for fast delivery.

Mount Sopris had

a three month delivery backlog which was further aggravated by
its inability to obtain circuit boards for making necessary
modules (T. 202-203).
Canter contacted two other manufacturers but he rejected
using their logging equipment because:
to three month waiting period,

(1)

they also had a two

(2) their equipment was

infer-

ior qualitatively and the Plaintiffs had specifically been awarded
contracts on the qualitative basis of the Mount Sopris equipment,
(3) Mount Sopris had a local supplier which could provide better
service to the Plaintiffs, and (4) the Plaintiffs desired to continue

to
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changed from logging unit to logging unit.

Canter attempted to

rent logging equipment pending replacement, but it was not possible to rent logging equipment (T. 203-205, 219-222; Ex. 11, 13).
Prior to the date that replacement was made, the Plaintiffs
were awarded another logging job by Amoco Minerals.
tiffs had

The Plain-

again been invited to bid by Lewis on the Alzada, Mon-

tana project and again had bid by their standard written price
list.

Again

Lewis had called Canter and told him that the Plain-

tiffs had been awarded the contract.

However, Canter told Lewis

that the Plaintiffs' replacement unit had not yet arrived and the
Plaintiffs could not perform.

Lewis then awarded the contract to

Digilog, a company which again had bid a higher price for its
logging services than had the Plaintiffs (T. 169-176, 205-208;
Ex. 12 , 16) .
Both Lewis and Canter testified that the Amoco Minerals
job was not performed by the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs'
remaining logging units were all committed and the Plaintiffs had
not been able to make replacement of the destroyed unit (T. 166,
173-175, 200, 207, 224-225).

Lewis testified that while he was

not authorized to sign formal written contracts for Amoco Minerals,
the written contracts would, in fact, have been signed by his
immediate superior, John Squyres, since neither his nor any other
geologists' bid recommendation had been rejected by Squyres in the
two and one-half years that he had worked for Amoco Minerals
(T. 193).

His testimony made clear that the geologists at Amoco

Minerals have their own budgets and it is the geologists who
determine which loggers will be awarded jobs (T. 172).

-26-
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Canter

testified that in all the occasions in which the Plaintiffs hdd
been officially contacted and awarded contracts, they had never
had a contracting company subsequently refuse to enter into a
formal written contract (T. 216).
Lewis and Canter both testified that, based upon the Plaintiffs' price list, the amount of

t~me

the jobs involved and the

number of feet that was actually logged and drifted by the replacement logging .companies, the Plaintiffs would have received
a gross profit from the two contracts of no less than $37,690.40
(T. 175-182, 209-210; Exhibits 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 1 ).

Canter

testified that additional mileage expenses at 17¢ per mile for
10,400 miles and additional employee per diem expenses at $700.00
per unit month for four operating months would have lessened the
value of the contracts by $4,568.00 leaving a net profit from the
contracts to the Plaintiffs of $33,122.40 (T. 211-214).
The evidence as presented was sufficient such that the
jury could have found that the Plaintiffs would have performed
the two Amoco Minerals contracts but for the loss of their logging
unit.

The Defendant offered no evidence to dispute the testimony

of Lewis and Canter, but merely contended that since an employee
authorized to sign a written contract for Amoco Minerals had not
testified that both contracts were legally formed, the jury could
not find that the contract had been formed.

The trial court

erroneously accepted the Defendant's contention and granted partial directed verdict against the Plaintiffs.

1 copies of these Exhibits are set forth in the Appendix hereto
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Whether legally binding contracts between Amoco Minerals
and the Plaintiffs, in fact, came into existence may be argued
but ultimately and sensibly the point is irrelevant since the key
issue is:

"Would the Plaintiffs have performed the logging for

Amoco if they would have had a logging unit available?''

Mr. Lewis

and Mr. Canter both testified that the Plaintiffs would have done
the logging under both contracts if the Plaintiffs would have had
a logging unit available.

The evidence before the jury was that

both jobs were orally awarded by Lewis to the Plaintiffs as
the low bidders and no recommendation by Lewis nor any other
geologist for Amoco Minerals had ever been rejected by his superior, John

Squyres~

Additionally, the Plaintiffs' services were

so desired at Amoco Minerals that two geologists were competing. to
get the Plaintiffs available units on their individual projects
(T. 172).

The evidence further showed that in their course of

business the Plaintiffs had never been notified that they had
been awarded a contract and then had the contracting company refuse to finalize the agreement via the formality of a written
contract (T. 193, 216).
An analogous situation may be found in the law of interference.

Interference with pre-contractual relations is action-

able where a contract would have been entered into had it not been
for the conduct of the Defendant.

45 Am Jur 2nd, Interference §40 .

.. . It is not necessary that it be
absolutely certain that a prospective
contract would have been entered into
were it not for the interference.
Reasonable assurance thereof in view of all
the circumstances is sufficient.
It is
sufficient to show that the relationship
between the plaintiff and another party
had advanced to the point where the
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parties intended and were about to
execute a contract br that negotiations were reasonably certain to
result in a contract advantageous to
the Plaintiff.
(Ibid.)
The evidence before the court clearly showed that it was
more than reasonably certain that the Plaintiffs would have
entered into and performed two advantageous contracts had their
logging unit not been destroyed.

Therefore, the court erred in

granting a directed verdict based upon the Defendant's stated
ground.
As to the court's unsolicited ground that he could see no
way that the jury could conclude what the Plaintiffs' profits
would have been, the evidence
numerically.

again was both clear and sound

Nothing was left to guesswork for the jury.

The

evidence was clearly before the jury that the Plaintiffs had experienced a net loss of profits of at least $33,122.40.
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 as summarized into a logical calculation by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17 and
testified to by both Lewis and Canter clearly showed that the
Plaintiffs had lost at least $37,690.40 in gross profits.

Canter

testified that expenses of $4,568.00 would have been incurred by
the Plaintiffs in performing the contracts, leaving a net loss of
profits of $33,122.40 (T. 175-182, 209-210).

Canter testified

that the expenses deducted would have been additional expenses
beyond the Plaintiff's normal operating expenses which were incurred during the months that the Plaintiffs would have been performing the contracts (T. 211).

He testified that no employees

were laid off after the fire and that no additional employees
would have been required to perform the contracts had a unit been
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available (T. 225-226).
The Plaintiffs' evidence was clear and capable of calculation.

It was so clear that the Defendant did not even move for a

directed verdict on this ground.

However, the Court apparently

did not grasp the concept that the Plaintiffs were seeking profits
specifically lost due to their loss of use of a specific logging
unit since it allowed the Defendant, over the Plaintiffs' objection, to question Canter regarding the Plaintiffs' gross income
for the entire year of 1979, a matter clearly irrelevant to how
much in prof its were lost due to the loss of the two contracts
(T.

228).
In Park V. Moorman Mfg. Co., Utah, 241 P2d 914 (1952) at

page 921, the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted the rule that
a Plaintiff may recover for the loss of use of property wrongfully destroyed by the Defendant:
We are in accord with the general
proposition that where property is
destroyed the true measure of damages
is the difference between the market
value of that property immediately
before the destruction and its replacement cost, plus its use value until it
can be replaced within the time required· of a prudent plaintiff in exercise of his duty to ·mitigate damages,
less any salvage value of the destroyed
property.
This replacement cost rule
has been applied in many cases of injury to personal and real property by
this court.
Pursuant to this rule of law, the Supreme Court in Park upheld the
lower court's instruction that the Plaintiff was entitled to damages equal to the loss of egg production from destroyed chickens
until replacement of the chickens could be prudently made by the

-30-
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Plaintiffs.
Park was relied upon by the California Court of Appeals
in Reynolds v. Bank of American National Trust and Savings Association, Cal., 335 P2d 741 (1959).
where an airplane

is

There the court ruled that

destroyed and not readily replaceable, the

Plaintiff is entitled to his loss of profits during the period
reasonably required to make replacement.

Directly in point with

the Plaintiffs' case, the Kansas Supreme Court in Peterson v.
Bachar, 193 Kan. 161, 392 P2d 853 (1964), ruled that where a motor
vehicle specially constructed for a specific purpose was destroyed
and the owner could not immediately obtain a substitute vehicle,
the Plaintiff was entitled to recover loss of earnings or loss of
profits provided the calculation could be made with reasonable
certainty.
In Park, at page 920, the Utah Supreme Court also stated:
The fundamental principle of damages
is to restore the injured party to the
position he would have been in had it
not been for the wrong of the other
party ... Definate rules which will measure the extent of recovery in all cases
even of a particular class are difficult
to formulate owing to the consideration
which must be given in each case to its
specific and perhaps peculiar surrounding
circumstances.
Stated in broad terms,
however, the measure of damages is such
sum as will compensate the person injured for the loss sustained with the
least burden to the wrongdoer consistant
with the idea of fair compensation, and
with the duty upon the person injured
to exercise reasonable care to mitigate
the injury, according to opportunities
that may fairly be or appear to be within
his reach ... (empahsis added).
The Plaintiffs, in the instant case, are in the business
of logging for the presence of uranium by using a van specially
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equipped with sophisticated and expensive logging equipment.
The Plaintiffs make profits by contracting out their logging units
on a job by job basis.

(Pretrial Order, page 3).

Jobs are bid

competitively and the Plaintiffs may bid several contracts at the
same time (T. 225).
Taking the Plaintiffs' specific circumstances into account,
the only fair way to recompense the Plaintiffs for the loss of
their logging unit is to award them the profits they would have
received from the two jobs they were awarded by Amoco Minerals,
but were unable to perform because of the loss of their logging
unit.

There clearly was sufficent evidence before the court to

allow the jury to conclude that the Plaintiffs had lost over
$33,000.00 j_n profits because of the loss of their logging unit.
The court therefore erred in directing a verdict against the
Plaintiffs on the issue of loss of profits.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs proved that the Defendant had negligently
serviced their logging unit causing it to burn.

The Defendant

failed to prove by substantial competent evidence that the Plaintiffs actions had been negligent and a contributing cause of the
fire.

The Plaintiffs' claim for loss of profits was supported by

substantial evidence and should have been submitted to the jury.
Therefore, the case should be remanded and judgment entered in
favor of the Plaintiff for $41,687.95, the damages stipulated to
for the loss of the logging unit.

The Plaintiff should, thereupon,

be granted a new trial on the issues of the unstipulated damages
to the van and logging unit and the Plaintiffs' loss of profits.
In the alternative, the Plaintiffs should be granted a new
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trial on all issues not stipulated to previously by the parties.
r~
.Respectfully submitted this

.J. 0

day of

9.:: ~

, 1982.

/Z/d/-"'./)
~· 2 i /'/~--L--;z:,~~
I

-

PAUL W. MORTENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants

~c{~)
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Nelson L. Hayes,
counsel for the Defendant-Respondant, RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON, P.O. Box 2465, Salt Lake city, Utah 84110, dated this

/{[></./..

day of

~

' 1982.
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FIELD SERVICES ~lk-&i1CJ /},;/
Co""T~v

•

4UO 31 ~ ltoad

x:x_J-f-

(;raucl Jamel ion, Coloraclo 0150 I

•

(303) 2.13.4 l 12

April 1, 1979
,t~+Price list - Mount Sopris Model 3000 Loggers

Equipment is four-channel and mounted in four-wheel drive vehicle.
STANDARD BASIS:

$4,650 per month + footage.

Includes 200 hours per month. On location standby and
logging hours recorded, only. Hours over 200 charged
$35.00 each. No charge for mileage, drive time, per
diem or regular days off. Additional charge of $350 per
month applicable to drift services.
Footage Rates:
Natural gamma, S-P, single point resistance .... $.07/ft.
Gamma, S-P, Resistance, normal resistivity .... $.08/ft.
Ganma, S-P, Resistance, Neutron ......•........ $.10/ft.
Gamma, resistance, ganma-garrma, caliper .••..... $.10/ft.
Digitized gamma (print) ..................•..... $.10/ft.
Borehole deviation (digitized+ computed) ...•.. $.05/ft.

CALL OUT BASIS:
Hourly (On-location only) •..........•••... $35.00/hr.
Mileage (roundtrip) ....................... $ .30/mile.
Footage .•.•....•.•..•....•.....•.•...•.... As above.
Deviation •......•....•••........•....•.... $35.00/day.
f

1

LOSS CHARGES:
;

Probes:
i

Gamma, S-P, Resistance, Resistivity ..... $3700
Gamma, S-P, Resistance, Neutron ......... $7500
Gamma, Res· is ta nee, gamma-gamma , cal i per.$ 7250
Drift .•........••.•................. ·.... $9250
Cable damage or loss .................... $ .70/ft.

Client is responsible for downhole loss of any probe or
radioactive tools. Repairs will be made by the client
at current repair or replacement prices. Above costs
are estimated.

NOTE:

Temperature, acoustic velocity, induced polarization,
magnetic susceptibility, three-arm caliper, magnetic tape
and other logs available. Prices subject to change at
any time.
; PLAINTIFF'S
E,XHIB

6!18------.
1
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£650 E. Apache/Tulsa, Oklahoma
Phone 918/838-9811

Amoco Minerals Co.
Suite 508, eee W. Hampden Ave.
Englewood, C080110
Contract #01
Dated June 29, 79

.

#,/

74115

INVOICE DA TE

7-31-79

INVOICE NO.

7996

CLIENT NO.

c 7-37

OlSCAll'TION

Alzada -

HOLE LOGGING SERVICES -

July, 1979

$3,950.00

Basic Rate $3950/mo

750.00

$750/mo

Deviometer:

2,547. 18

Footage Chg:

28,302'

x.09/ft

Overtime:

7.4 hr

x l8.29hr

Neutron:

28,302'

x.02/ft

566.04

Deviation:

28,210'

x. 06/ft

l,692.60

Per Diem:

23/da

x $30/da

. .. . .
I I

...:·. ..

J

1···'

I'

() i.F .. ~

.

. l

l

~·

690 . 00

$10>358.24

I

/(J.17,,
I\~

I

I 7.'f I
. l ), ( .·\, .l,
. .. ".
. ~; .
r.3/tc/17
I
0>
.. k rl J'.. i_/_,,,,,,!·:'.. ~(vQ;;. •. · TO
!/
/
..
<v'\·: . DATE RECEIVED: 8--/n
-

162.42

I '~

' / I

( 1..~ ';

1.2

~

~'

·/.-. .Irl·:~d.tG
/ /9<;-;Y

~·

!¢'\,

~

'/

DATE _...:--...:--Ji.-SENT
CHICAGO

0

{

,.

APFRDV~D

FUR

79 . .

'l

--!K-'..~~~~--....--i .-{...)
/'
I.
"'~0~Uli
~'T 17"~
J._. ti:i;

PAY~ENT

D'F

MfdH PRiM SEC S?EC

----·

.

.,--

Jo,l'Jf. 6 2- 0 t

COUNTY,

RVtCE.S PERFORMED IN
t PARTY

MT.

04
~

•

J

PLAINTIFF'S ·

E~J)T

1

~5
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Contract #1, Dated June 29,INVOICE DATE

Amoco Minerals Co.
Suite 508
.
West Hampton Ave.
E~glewood, CO 80110

1979
INVOICE NO.
CLIENT NO.

·s-Jl-79

8089.·
c 8-10
AUOVHT

OICSCAIPTION

Alzada - August, 1979

1E HOL£ LOCCINQ SERVICES -

_... . /

Basic Rate:

$3950/mo

x 25%

$987.50

Devi ornete r:

· $750/mo

x 25%

l 87. 50

Foot.age Chg:

3978'

x.09/ft

358.02

Neutron:

3978'

x.02/ft

79.56

Deviation:

5561'

x.06/ft

333.66

x $30/da

180.00

Per Diem:

6/da

$2,126.24

DATE REC £PIED·_--'--...:..=....-~?fL----7/--:
APPRO'f£D FOR PAYMEHT BY·u.;_. . ~~-~~
MA1~ PRIM SEC SPEC
~

#AI.

-

iERVICE.S PERFORMED IN

COUNTY,

~

JR PARTY

01

MT.

I

PLAINTIFF'S
.EXHI IT
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No·

Oa;e:

•t '. . t•

J•t;
;

•

0196

1~-30-79

1 0 I 3 0 -1 1 I 3 1I7 9

J\ 1 z ada
Customer P.O. No.:

, MT

location:

Job Number:

~ ..

··-~

-- ...... .. --- ·...

.! •

. . .... . . .. . ... ···'

Project Date:

Steve Lewis

.

\,.; ·--·
.

•,I

INVOICE

MINERALS COMPANY
First National Bank Building
333 West Hampden, Suite 508
Englewood, CO 80110

AMOCO

-

'

·.,·
..•.~-'-'
-•
:.!•'

s~~

~ttn:

.. I . ' • ..,

. . . . . -- .. - .. -- - --. .--· I '
' f I •~'
'(
J:
I· 't
I J'( II'-•.
r
,,..7•
)'•'•
•

38 • 01

Unit Number:

Net 15 days

Terms:

Date Due:

Dec 15, 1979

Service Performed

Unit

Price

$3950.00

1

Monthly Term Fee
Footage:
gamma, SP, Res, Neutron

Total

34,209'

.10

3420.90

26,724'

.08 .-

2137.92

500.00

Drift Tool rental

1 mo

Per Diem

23 days

35.00

805.00

32.75

35.00

1146.25

Overtime

No charge for extra hours
for· 11/2,11/5,11/6,11/21

n/c
n/c

.

... . .....

'-

r

......

~~~~sc Pa/f'rorn This Invoice

71- -·~
Jt 8 - l/'10

~ecJ.5j

11 - Jig - '/Yo

J.f?G.'fb M('Jotal amount

·-----~

---------•
I IC

f> a)- -

-" "

-'

J

OJ{6)

.
I.

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
I/_

"'"' ·· · t·

,:.,;-..1 (c',.
du6').\<v

(}... l\ '

-cf;- //:5

$11,960.0

,.-)~---

___ Check No. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Amoun _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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AMOCO

INvo ICE

MINERALS COMPANY

First National Bank Building
333 West Hampden, Su~te sou

•

.. . ' .

... ••

• 1"'

No:
0201.~~
.Oate : 1 2 - 3 1 - 7 9
i;.~

NQ

Project Date: 12/1 - 1 2/7 /7 9
location: Al zada, MT

Englewood, CO 80110

\ ••

•

;':e

·

·::~w1

Customer P.O. No.:

38.01

Job Number:
Unit Number:

Net 15 Days

Terms:

D-6,

D-5

~1

~:

January 15, 1980

Date Due:

Unit

Service Performed

Price

Total

Progress Billing
Term Fee:

Footage: gamma, SP, Res, Neutron

• 10

55'

.08

4. 4o::i tt l

16,623'

.08

1329.84~ ....

rerun
deviation survey

s

25,877'

2587. 70

:. ' "
~

'••I

Note:

this is a progress billing, term

fee, per diem, and any overtime
will be billed at end of project
i n J a nua r y
L,·. ·:t-:- r '"' • • · • - ,1

(/l. /£0 ..,....-,TE ______

Sc :~r ln CHlCAGC
r
~'I
I . IBc
'//"I
n. ~.. -· - .. -• • --' •-,__----~------+--f.:_.<.....
--·-- - . . ·. } . t//{-( /..~ j.f. u. .Ptd:
. ~ .~ ··--;
~ . . ~ ~- ~ j . ~ ·~ :.:~ ~ ~ i ~:;: {
"'
F ·
t: :-'· 1 r ... ·' '"'· ···
"· · ' r '=- [ i' ' · '· 1T J,
a••• ~:.l
f.: .• ;, v ... : t;.·~1_, i.:.~ L U;a..
~1;·;J,b )t1·/J, \~
I •

E. Bfcx.k 4-0/,?. 0
/J/, fioc h-

D~

• .• " ' : •

•

•

1_ .(.

~ ~,

3S-2-D.74
......___
....

~'

~

~ ~

'J '17/ --_ · j [, £-._ fi4·(2.
'/ 't 71 - } £. 6 - '-I 'I ?

...

Please Pay From This Invoice
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~e Payment Rec'd - - - - - - - - - - - -

'l ~

--

'/o/. ~ o

"v(')
) >- Jc. 7'f c;Co)

<.. ~
\'·,

-

INVOICE

~;

I\

AMOCO MINERALS COMPANY

~:;e:Ngs-ao 02os

Project Date: Dec 1
Location: Alzada,

First National Building
333 West Hampden, Suite 508

- Jan 1, 198 0
Montana

Customer P.O. No.:

Englewood, CO 80110

38.01
D-5, D-6

Job Number:
Unit Number:

Net 15 ·day.s

Terms:

'

1-23-80

Date Due:

.. Service Performed

Unit

Price

Total

[(1.,-------------------------t-------+---------"-----~

Term fee

( 2 trucks w/operators)

52,217'
808'
37,906'
4,785'

Footage: gamma, SP, R, Neutron

rerun
deviation survey
wireline

1:

....

.

I
-

·.: .. '·

I

~'~
. .-..,,t.
,,.

no charge for extra hours on
12/14,12/15,12/20,12/22

Overtime
Mi le age

96.5

hr~

1

~

!e

•

-

,

,.-~.,~

I ••••

--.....

--

c--~")
~;·

'-:Jl.B - '!'lo

1- J(, 8 -

64.64
-303.~·~

'f lf 0

'1rc Payment Rec'd

...._,

!/t.,/-:,c

.. . --

:HlChG~

~·::: &J ,£.!t_'1~-" /J.J~A.:·~T
..r
: ~:·;·rr.«a~ Pay From This Invoice
.~ :.~ ·:·l. f ·:
1l: .. v.,;&tl
i .. ~;.
~d

.

-

4B

':J

500.00

35.00

1505.00

35.00

3377.50

?X

..

,,.
~ <' ..
.. "
~-

i•\J.&
. .r:~·1•:••••7
. .1,
........ ..
, : ••• :. ••••

.. ·. ( ..

I

• 08
• 08

n/c

footage charged on invoice 201
for 12/1 - 12/7 is not included on
this invoice
r!'"·~ . . ;··-:i - . -...... -..../' 1 .~
DATE
1 '---.; . ._____
0
i~~u~~"i.:j: ______
,_:..>_..~
~
SENT lo

·\J··.:.~;

5221.70

no charge

l,..,I ... ". , ,•-1
•
-

• 10

239.25

i note:
I

7900.00

.05

-1
~

43 days

Per diem

s

3950.00

1 unit

Drift tool rental
JI

s

2

"")ttlJ't

1~:.11..Z't

~ ..

/ S-11 .5L

,;

\~

,, ...
.

,.L.. ..
\

\

....

\

I-··

.#(.' .••

---

oJ(B)total amount this invoice ... $ :~,8~~-~o ',(c-)
('. 61o .Jr .,.. I .5 I 2.. • S" 1 l_-,--,-7-"/-~-.-</)--'
w. f31C¥k 1f( 2 :31-. }./f j
1

I

-----------

'..

~

5_~.rir.

Check No. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Amoun t.___ _
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1

ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES
480

31~

Road

•

Grand Junction, Colorado

. INVOICE

Project:Alzada, Mont.
Basis: Monthly
Client:AMOCO Minerals
Date

Daily Fee

Reg

81501

OT

Feet

•

(303) 243-4112

Period Ending:
Invoice Date:
Due By:
Miles

Exp 1a nation

Drift

Drift Footage
ly 1979

$4650.00

28,302
x.10
$2830.20

-

$350.00

28,210
x.05
$1410.50

Totals
-

-totals

Daily

$4650.00
8a;etat:iffle
2830.20
Fee~a§e
350.00
~4i l cage
1410.50

-

~ls

..
~

PLAINTIFF'S

i?T·

Grand Total: $9240. 70
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ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES
480 3 l Y.t Road

•

Grand Junction, Colorado

81501

•

(303) 243-4112

M**

Date

Oa i ly

Period Ending:
Invoice Date:
Due By:

INVOICE

Project:
Basis:
Fee

Reg

OT

Feet

Miles

r'r~ ·

r, ·~,

;:1

Explanation

Drift

~

Drift Footage

:\ug

1979

$4650.00
x.25
$1162.25

3978
x.10
$397.80

$87.50

5561
x.05
$278.05

Totals

,-

:b-totals

--.,a 1s

$1162.25
Daily
397.80
Overti1t1e
87.50
J=eeta§e
278.05
Mn ea§e

Grand Total: $1925 .60
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ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES
480 31~ Road
•,'

,.., ' I

I

'' •

'

'

I

,

'

•

• '•

~

t

·,

t

o

es••

•
AF

Grand Junction, Colorado

™''
INVOICE

Project:
Basis:
)ate

Daily Fee

Reg

OT

)-

(303) 243-4112

Feet

•,,

I

1,•

•I,

•,',,,

'\

1

1
1

,II

ttt

t

Period Ending:
Invoice Date:
Due By:
Mil es

Drift

'-

'I

•

...,. swaw

1

W1

81501

Explanation
Drift Footage

1979

$4650.00

34,209
x.10
$3420.90

$350.00
x

26,724
x.05
$1336.20

Totals
totals

-:al s

Daily
Overti~e

Feeta§e

Mn ea~s

$4650.00
3420.90
350.00
1336.20

Grand Tota 1: $975 7. 1 O
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•

•

I.I

ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES
•

480 31 Y.i Road

Grand Junction, Colorado

AP*

Daily Fee

Reg

OT

Feet

•

(303) 2434112

a

Period Ending:
Invoice Date:
Due By:

INVOICE

Project:
Basis:
Date

,,.,.,.,.

81501

Mil es

Exp l a na ti on

Drift

Drift Footage
Dec 1979

$9300.00
(2 Trucks)

52,217
x.10
$5221.70

37,906
x.05
$1895.30

$350 ._00

I

(

Totals
Sub-totals

Daily
Qye~~~~e

r.:ee~a~e
~H ~ ea~e

Totals

-

$9300.00
5221.70
3 50. 00
1895.30

Grand Total : $16, 767 .oo
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